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Abstract
Probability-like parameters appearing in some statistical models, and their
prior distributions, are reinterpreted through the notion of ‘circumstance’, a
term which stands for any piece of knowledge that is useful in assigning a prob-
ability and that satisfies some additional logical properties. The idea, which
can be traced to Laplace and Jaynes, is that the usual inferential reasonings
about the probability-like parameters of a statistical model can be conceived as
reasonings about equivalence classes of ‘circumstances’ — viz., real or hypo-
thetical pieces of knowledge, like e.g. physical hypotheses, that are useful in
assigning a probability and satisfy some additional logical properties — that
are uniquely indexed by the probability distributions they lead to.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Cw,02.50.Tt,01.70.+w
MSC numbers: 03B48,62F15,60A05
If you can’t join ’em,
join ’em together.
0 Introduction
In the present first study we offer an alternative point of view on, or a re-interpretation
of, probability-like parameters and ‘probabilities of probabilities’, two objects that
appear in connexion with statistical models. This also provides a re-interpretation of
some kinds of inverse methods, for which we develop a simple and general logical
framework. This point of view, which we think is basically Laplace’s but uses an
∗Email: mana@kth.se
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idea presented in nuce in some work by Jaynes, is alternative to both that based on
the distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘subjective’ probabilities, and that based on
de Finetti’s theorem. This point of view and the ensuing inverse-method framework
have applications in physical theories, as will be shown in following studies [1, 2].
Our study and results are based exclusively on probability theory; we do not use
entropy notions, for example. For us, ‘probability’ means simply plausibility, and
the following conceptual proportion holds:1
Plausibility calculus : Everyday notion of ‘plausibility’ =
Logical calculus : Everyday notion of ‘truth’.
We thus take the licence to adopt the term plausibility henceforth2 — with no need to
define what it means, any more than it is usually done with ‘truth’.3 (Our study can
in any case be easily ‘translated’ into degrees-of-belief, credence, or similar terms.)
The notation P(A| I) [5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23] (cf. also [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]) will denote the
plausibility of the statement A in the context described by the proposition I.4 We shall
also say that I ‘leads to’ or ‘yields’ a given plausibility of A, but no particular meaning
is intended with these two verbs. Associated plausibility densities will be denoted by
x 7→ pA(x| I); the term ‘distribution’ will be used for ‘density’ sometimes. Other
symbols and notations are used in accordance with ISO [44] and ANSI/IEEE [45]
standards.
In another study [46] we analyse the question of assigning plausibilities to un-
known ‘events’ (e.g., measurement outcomes) from knowledge of ‘similar events’; a
1Does also Wittgenstein mean something of the kind when he writes ‘Probability theory is only
concerned with the state of expectation in the sense in which logic is with thinking’ [3, § 237][4,
p. 231]? See also Johnson [5, pp. 2–3].
2Also used by Kordig [6].
3Is truth objective or subjective? Can truth be ‘operationally’ defined? Can the truth of a proposi-
tion be tested? — ‘Of course! to test the truth of ‘This hat is brown’ I only need to look at the hat!’.
Well, provided e.g. that you are not dreaming or having hallucinations; and how do you test that? Going
backwards, in the end you arrive at some proposition which you simply assume — unconsciously, by
convention, by agreement, by caprice — and cannot ‘test’. ‘Subjectivity’ lurks no less in logic than in
plausibility theory — and is no less uninteresting in plausibility theory than it is in logic.
4The context could also be called ‘condition’ or ‘situation’; Johnson calls it ‘supposal’ [5] ; Jeffreys
simply ‘data’ [17]. In the notation above, there is a relation (in the sense in which there is a relation
between ‘certain’ and ‘true’) between the expressions ‘P(A| I) = 1’ and ‘I |= A’ (especially when
this is used as in situational logic; see e.g. [38, 39, 40, 41]). The latter could also be suggestively
written ‘T(A| I) = 1’. The differences between the formalisms of logic and plausibility theory lie
essentially in the fact that our everyday use of truth can be effectively (but not exclusively) modelled
through a dichotomic set like {0, 1} (or {⊤,⊥} or {T,F}), whereas our everyday use of plausibility can
be effectively modelled through an ordered continuum like [0, 1] (or [0,+∞] or [−∞,+∞], see e.g.
Tribus [42, pp. 26–29], Jaynes [20, ch. 2], Cox [12]). This has important implications, like the fact that
a purely syntactic approach to plausibility, in the guise of the logical calculus, is near to worthless [43].
The parallel between plausibility theory and truth-functional logic suggests also another point. We do
not require of logic, when put to practical use, that it should also provide us with the initial truth-value
assignments (the ‘assumptions’). Why should we have an analogous requirement on plausibility theory
with regard to initial plausibility-value assignments instead?
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problem which is connected to induction. The key point is the formalisation, within
probability theory, of the notion of ‘similar event’. This we do through the framework
and the interpretation presented in the first note. We do not use the idea of exchange-
ability — and infinite exchangeability in particular — which is used in Bayesian
theory for the same purpose; but there are known strong connexions and analogies
with its mathematics and some of its results. In fact, we try to persuade the reader
that our approach touches the core idea from which exchangeability also springs.
In a third note [1, 2] it will be shown that the inferential point of view presented
here and in [46] finds applications in physical theories, like classical and quantum
mechanics, an example being state reconstruction [47, 48]. The framework pre-
sented subsumes and re-interprets known techniques of quantum-state assignment (or
‘retrodiction’ or ‘reconstruction’) and tomography, and offers alternative approaches
to analogous techniques in classical mechanics.
1 Statistical models and ‘probabilities of probabilities’
A statistical model is, roughly speaking, a plausibility distribution whose numerical
values depend on parameters (for a critical discussion of more rigorous or useful
definitions see [49, 50]). An example is the ubiquitous normal distribution
x 7→ N(x|µ, 1/σ2) ≔ 1√
2piσ
exp
[
− (x − µ)
2
2σ2
]
whose parameters are the expectation µ and the variance σ . Another example, one
in which we shall be especially interested in this paper, is the ‘generalised Bernoulli’
model i 7→ Br(i| q), which gives the plausibility distribution for a set of m mutually
exclusive and exhaustive propositions {R1, . . . ,Rm}, hereafter called outcomes,
p(Ri| q) = Br(i| q) ≔ qi, (1)
depending on a set of parameters q ≔ (q1, . . . , qm) which belong to a simplex of
appropriate dimensionality:
q ∈ ∆ ≔ {(xi) | xi > 0,∑ixi = 1}. (2)
(This model is apparently called ‘discrete model’. Since this name is too anonymous
and the model reduces to the Bernoulli one for m = 2, we opted for ‘generalised
Bernoulli’ instead.)
The parameters of a statistical model are sometimes regarded as ‘unknown’, and
a plausibility distribution (more precisely, a density) for them is therefore introduced.
This distribution, usually called ‘prior distribution’ or simply ‘prior’, is used in cal-
culations for a variety of purposes; two in particular interest us here and in the fol-
lowing papers. (1) A parameter-free plausibility distribution for the outcomes can
be obtained integrating the product of the prior and the statistical model in respect
of the parameters, i.e., by marginalisation. In the case of the Bernoulli model, e.g.,
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introducing a prior q 7→ f (q) ( f being of course a normalised positive generalised
function) one obtains the parameter-free distribution
p(Ri) =
∫
∆
Br(i| q) f (q) dq ≡
∫
∆
qi f (q) dq. (3)
(2) In so called ‘inverse methods’ or ‘problems’ (cf. Dale [51, §§ 1.2, 1.3]), the
prior is used in the formula of Bayes’ theorem to obtain an ‘updated’ plausibility
distribution for the parameters, conditional on knowledge of some outcome. The
resulting distribution is called ‘posterior (distribution)’. In the case of the Bernoulli
model, e.g., from the prior q 7→ f (q) and knowledge of the outcome Ri one obtains
the posterior
q 7→ f (q|Ri) = p(Ri| q) f (q)∫
∆
p(Ri| q′) f (q′) dq′
. (4)
Such practices are at least as old as Bayes [52, 53, 54]. Related and unrelated
historical information can be found e.g. in Dale’s book [51] and some nice essays
by Hacking [55, 56, 57]; see also Jaynes’ discussion [20, ch. 18]. Old, though ap-
parently not as old as Bayes, is also the question: how to interpret statistical-model
parameters like q and their prior distributions? The problem is that the parameters
(qi) look like plausibilities, since their values are identical to the plausibilities of the
outcomes {Ri} as eq. (1) shows, and that the prior f looks therefore like a ‘plausibility
(distribution) of a plausibility’ — a redundant notion. This question, combined with
the related issues on the interpretation of ‘probability’, has led to many philosophical
debates; see e.g., amongst the vast literature on this, [58, 59]. The importance of
the interpretative question is not merely philosophical, however. Different interpre-
tations can lead to different conceptual and mathematical approaches — and thus to
different solutions — in the investigation of concrete problems. This is particularly
true for elaborate statistical models, like those connected to physical theories.
Two main interpretations appear to be in vogue. Many statisticians, logicians,
and physicists, on the one hand, speak about ‘subjective’ and ‘physical’ probabilities
(or ‘propensities’ [60]). For them the notion of a ‘probability of a probability’ poses
no problems, since it means something like ‘the subjective probability of a propen-
sity’. The very idea of ‘estimating a probability’ implies such kinds of interpretation;
cf. e.g. Good [61], especially the title and chapter 2, Jamison [62], or Tintner [63].
For pious Bayesian or ‘de Finettian’ devotees, on the other hand, which con-
ceive probability as ‘degree of belief’, the notion of a ‘degree of belief in a degree
of belief’ is redundant or even meaningless. The Bayesian are notoriously rescued
from philosophical headaches by de Finetti’s celebrated theorem and other similar
ones [64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78], by which parameters
like q and functions like q 7→ f (q) are introduced as mere mathematical devices —
i.e., not plausibilities or degrees of belief! — that need not be directly interpreted.
See Bernardo and Smith [76, ch. 4] for a neat presentation of this point of view. In-
terpretative issues like the Bayesian’s are also shared by those who thinks in terms of
‘logical probabilities’ [79] or, like we, simply in terms of ‘plausibilities’.
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Here we present, discuss, and formalise still another interpretation — let us call
it the ‘circumstance interpretation’ for definiteness’ sake, for reasons that will be
apparent in the next section — in which functions like q 7→ f (q) do represent plau-
sibility distributions, i.e., they are not mere mathematical devices, but the notion of
‘plausibility of a plausibility’ is nevertheless completely avoided. This interpretation
combines two ideas by which Jaynes tried to make sense of ‘plausibility-like’ param-
eters: one is very briefly formulated in [80, p. 11], and can possibly be read also in
de Finetti [81, § 20]; the other — the idea of an ‘Ap distribution’ — appears in the var-
ious versions of his book on probability theory [18, lect. 18][19, lect. 5][20, ch. 18].
A similar interpretation is also proposed and discussed by Mosleh and Bier [59].
Caves also discusses, and criticises, a similar idea [78, 82]. It really seems to us,
however, that this interpretation is basically what Laplace had in mind [53], if we
read his ‘causes’ more generally as ‘circumstances’.
Instead of trying to summarise this interpretation in abstract general terms that
would very likely only appear obscure at this point, we prefer to invite the reader to
proceed to the simple and concrete example of the next section, just a coin toss away.
The example will allow us to introduce the basic idea, along with some terminology.
Then another, more elaborate example (§ 3) follows, to further expand the main idea.
This is then abstracted and generalised (§ 4). Some important remarks are scattered
throughout this note.
2 Interpreting plausibility-like parameters as ‘indexed
circumstances’: introductory example
2.1 Context and circumstances
A coin has been tossed, the outcome unknown to us. We want to assign plausibilities
to the outcomes ‘head’, Rh, and ‘tail’, Rt. The old recipe says to compute “le rapport
du nombre des cas favorables à celui de tous les cas possibles” [54]. This is seldom
of much help: Which are the cases? at which depth should the situation be analysed?
And what if these cases are not equally plausible?
But why not analyse the situation in terms of some set of ‘cases’ anyway? Some
set, not the set. And their plausibilities can be assigned by some other means. We do
not want the ultimate analysis, just an analysis.
In our case, suppose that the knowledge of the situation, which constitutes the
context Ico, says that either Cecily or Gwendolen or Jack or Algernon tossed the
coin. Let us call these the four possible circumstances of the coin toss and denote
them by CC, CG, CJ, CA. The context could thus be analysed as the conjunction
Ico = Jco ∧ (CC ∨ CG ∨ CJ ∨ CA), for some ‘sub-context’ Jco.
Each circumstance says also something more about the respective person, which
helps us in assigning the conditional plausibilities:5
5Cf. Laplace’s Problème II [53].
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CC: Cecily is a magician and skilled coin-tosser that always like to produce the
outcome ‘head’. If we knew that she had tossed the coin, we would assign the
distribution of plausibility(
P(Rh|CC ∧ Ico), P(Rt|CC ∧ Ico)
)
= (1, 0) (5)
for the outcomes.
CG: Gwendolen, on the other hand, has no such particular skills, so if it were her
who had tossed the coin we would assign the plausibility distribution(
P(Ri|CG ∧ Ico)
)
=
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, (6)
with i = h, t here and in the following.
CJ: On Jack we know nothing whatsoever. He could be skilled or unskilled in
coin-tossing, a trickster or an absolutely earnest person. If we knew he had
tossed the coin we could but assign the distribution(
P(Ri|CJ ∧ Ico)
)
=
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
. (7)
CA: Finally, we know that Algernon had been carrying a double-headed coin, which
he would exchange with the original one if asked to toss it. So we assign the
plausibilities (
P(Ri|CA ∧ Ico)
)
= (1, 0) (8)
in case he had made the coin toss.
Remark 1. It is clear that not all the circumstances above express ‘causes’ [53] or
‘mechanisms’ [18, lects. 16, 17][19, lect. 5][20, ch. 18][78] which ‘determine’ the
respective plausibility distributions. It could be appropriate to say this of the circum-
stance concerning Algernon; but the circumstance concerning Jack, e.g., can hardly
be called a ‘cause’ or ‘mechanism’: it is only out of sheer ignorance that we assign,
conditionally upon it, the distribution (1/2, 1/2). Here and in the following, ‘circum-
stance’ will generally mean simply what its name denotes: ‘a possibly unessential or
secondary condition, detail, part, state of affair, factor, accompaniment, or attribute,
in respect of time, place, manner, agent, etc., that accompanies, surrounds, or possi-
bly determines, modifies, or influences a fact or event’ (cf. [83]).
2.2 Grouping the circumstances in a special way
The crucial step now is the following. Suppose that these four circumstances interest
us not for their intrinsic details, but only in connexion with the plausibility distribu-
tions they lead to for the coin toss in the context Ico. In this regard, the circumstance
‘Cecily tossed the coin’6 and the circumstance ‘Algernon tossed the coin’ are for us
6Our knowledge about Cecily must also be understood as implicit in this sentence; otherwise we
should write ‘Cecily, who is a magician etc., tossed the coin’. This also holds for the sentences that
follow.
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equivalent, since both lead to the plausibility distribution (1, 0), as shown by eqs. (5)
and (8). Similarly, ‘Gwendolen tossed the coin’ and ‘Jack tossed the coin’ are also
equivalent, both leading to (1/2, 1/2); cf. eqs. (6) and (7). We should like to have a
set of circumstances such that different circumstances led to different distributions.
The first thing that comes to mind is to take the set {CC ∨ CA,CG ∨ CJ} of the dis-
junctions of equivalent circumstances, i.e. CC ∨CA ≡ ‘Cecily or Algernon tossed the
coin’ and CG ∨ CJ ≡ ‘Gwendolen or Jack tossed the coin’. We must see, however,
whether this ‘coarse-grained’ set really fulfils our wishes.
A simple theorem of plausibility theory comes to help. It says that, in a given
context, the plausibility of a statement A conditional on a disjunction of mutually
exclusive propositions {B j} is given by a convex sum of the plausibilities conditional
on the single propositions, as follows [20, ch. 2]:
P[A| (∨ jB j) ∧ I] =
∑
j
P(A| B j ∧ I)
P(B j| I)∑
l P(Bl| I) ({B j} mutually exclusive), (9)
the weights being proportional to the plausibilities of the {B j}. Note that the value of
the plausibility conditional on the disjunction, P[A| (∨ jB j) ∧ I], generally depends
on the values of the plausibilities of the {B j}, {P(B j| I)}. Thus, the latter plausibilities
must in general be specified if we want to find the first, and that varies as these vary.
However, we see that this dependence disappears when the plausibilities conditional
on each single B j, {P(A| B j ∧ I)}, have all the same value (the right-hand side be-
comes a convex sum of identical points). In this case also the plausibility conditional
on the disjunction, P[A| (∨ jB j) ∧ I], will have that same value, irrespective of the
plausibilities of the {B j}:7
if P(A| B j ∧ I) = q for all j, then P[A| (∨ jB j) ∧ I] = q,
regardless of the values of the {P(B j| I)}. (10)
Clearly this is just the case when A is either of our outcomes {Ri} and the {B j}
are either pair of equivalent circumstances. In fact, the protasis of the last formula
is just our previous definition of equivalence amongst circumstances. Hence, the
plausibility distribution for the results conditional on the disjunction CC ∨ CA is the
same as those conditional on the two disjuncts separately,
(
P[Ri| (CC ∨ CA) ∧ Ico]
)
=
(
P(Ri|CC ∧ Ico)
)
=
(
P(Ri|CA ∧ Ico)
)
= (1, 0), (11)
and analogously for CG ∨ CJ:(
P[Ri| (CG ∨CJ) ∧ Ico]
)
=
(
P(Ri|CG ∧ Ico)
)
=
(
P(Ri|CJ ∧ Ico)
)
=
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
. (12)
This is true whatever the plausibilities of our four initial circumstances might be (in
fact, we have not yet specified them!).
7Cases of vanishing plausibilities can be treated as appropriate limits. One can adopt the consistent
convention that the product of an undefined plausibility (such as those with a contradictory context)
times a defined and vanishing one also vanishes.
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The coarse-grained set {CC ∨CA,CG ∨CJ} has thus, by construction, the special
feature we looked for: different circumstances lead to different plausibility distribu-
tions for the outcomes. The circumstances can therefore be uniquely indexed by the
respectively assigned plausibility distributions, and we denote them accordingly:
S (1,0) ≔ CC ∨CA, S ( 1
2 ,
1
2
) ≔ CG ∨ CJ, (13)
and call them plausibility-indexed circumstances. With this indexing system, and
denoting q ≔ (qh, qt), the conditional plausibilities of the outcomes can be written
P(Ri| S q ∧ Ico) = qi. (14)
The last expression is in many ways similar to that defining the generalised
Bernoulli model (1). Indeed, one of our main points is the following: plausibility-like
parameters used as arguments of plausibilities can always be interpreted to stand for
appropriate plausibility-indexed circumstances.
In view of eq. (14), someone could interpret the symbol ‘S q’ as ‘The plausibility
distribution for the {Ri} is q’ (similarly to the symbol ‘Ap’ introduced by Jaynes [18,
lect. 18][19, lect. 5][20, ch. 18]). But such an interpretation is obviously wrong. Let
us make this point clear. The symbol ‘S (1,0)’, e.g., stands for ‘Cecily or Algernon
tossed the coin’, as eq. (13) shows; and this proposition does not concern plausi-
bilities at all. It is true that this proposition is the only one leading us to assign
the distribution (1, 0); but it is so just because of a trick, viz. the fact that we have
grouped and indexed the initial circumstances in a particular way. Borrowing some
terminology from logic, we can say that the correspondence between the proposition
‘Cecily or Algernon tossed the coin’ and the distribution (1, 0) is only a trick within
the metalanguage of our theory [84, 85, 86, 87, 88].
Remark 2. The use of statements like ‘The plausibility of A is p’ or ‘Data are drawn
from a distribution f ’ is universal. Of course, they can be simply interpreted as
‘Look, the context and the circumstance are such that the plausibility of A (the data)
is p ( f )’, and this can be enough for our purposes: we may not need to know all the
details of the context and the circumstance. But note that those statements are more
precisely metastatements, statements about plausibility assignments. As in logic, the
use of such kind of statements as arguments of plausibility formulae is preferably
avoided. First, because such statements usually make poor contexts. Compare the
statements ‘Either Jack, who is a skilled coin tosser with a predilection for ‘head’, or
Algernon, who has a two-headed coin, tossed the coin’ with ‘The plausibility distri-
bution for ‘head’ and ‘tail’ is (1, 0)’: the former gives some clues as to the grounds
on which the distribution (1, 0) is assigned, whereas the latter says only that that dis-
tribution is assigned.8 Second, because such statements used inside plausibility for-
8It reminds of Bachelierus’ oft quoted answer: “Mihi a docto Doctore/ Domandatur causam et
rationem, quare/ Opium facit dormire?/ À quoi respondeo,/ Quia est in eo/ Virtus dormitiva./ Cujus est
natura/ Sensus assoupire” [89, troisième intermède].
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mulae may give rise to self-references, circularity, and thus known paradoxes (‘This
proposition is false’) and other inconsistencies [88, 90].9
2.3 Analysis by marginalisation
Let us now introduce the plausibilities of the original circumstances in the context
Ico. For concreteness we can assume them to be equally plausible:
P(CC| Ico) = P(CG| Ico) = P(CJ| Ico) = P(CA| Ico) = 14 . (15)
From these values and the definitions (13) we have by the sum rule the plausibilities
of the plausibility-indexed circumstances:
P[S (1,0)| Ico] = 12 , P[S
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)| Ico] = 12 . (16)
These plausibilities can be used to write the distribution for the outcomes on
context Ico by marginalisation over the circumstances. We can do this both with the
initial set {C j} and with the set of plausibility-indexed set {S q}. With the first we
obtain (
P(Ri| Ico)
)
=
∑
j
(
P(Ri|C j ∧ Ico)
)
P(C j| Ico) =
(
3
4 ,
1
4
)
. (17)
With the second set we must of course obtain, consistently, the same result; but the
decomposition has a more suggestive (and possibly misleading!) form:
(
P(Ri| Ico)
)
=
∑
q
(
P(Ri| S q ∧ Ico)
)
P(S q| Ico),
=
∑
q
q P(S q| Ico) =
(
3
4 ,
1
4
)
.
(18)
The index q assumes the two values {(1, 0), (1/2, 1/2)}, but we can let it range over
the whole simplex ∆ defined in (2), introducing a density function q 7→ pS (q| Ico) in
the usual way (explained later in § 4). In this case it is given by
pS (q| I) ≔ 12
[
δ(qh − 1) + δ
(
qh − 12
)]
δ(qh + qt − 1), (19)
9We find an example in an article by Friedman and Shimony [91]. They introduce a proposition
which says that the expectation of a certain quantity has a given value (their eq. (4)). But such a
proposition is a metastatement, because expectation is defined in terms of plausibility assignments (in
contrast to average, which is defined in terms of measured frequencies [92]). The authors, however, do
not notice this and proceed to use that proposition inside plausibilities, obtaining peculiar conclusions.
Gage and Hestenes [93] apparently show that these conclusions are not inconsistent, although they do
not notice the mix-up of language and metalanguage either. Cyranski [94] has a partially clearer view
of the matter. Cf. remark 6. A metastatement inside a plausibility is used, although tentatively, also
by Jaynes (his ‘Ap’) [18, lect. 18][19, lect. 5][20, ch. 18]; but our analysis shows that his ideas can be
realised without this artifice.
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a weighted sum of Dirac deltas10 with support on q = (1, 0) and (1/2, 1/2). The
marginalisation (18) thus takes the form
(
P(Ri| Ico)
)
=
∫
∆
q pS (q| Ico) dq, (20)
which is similar to the formula (3) for the generalised Bernoulli model.
2.4 Updating the plausibility of the circumstances
If the outcome of the toss is, say, ‘head’, what do the plausibilities of the circum-
stances become? In other words, what are the circumstances’ plausibilities in the
context Rh ∧ Ico? The answer is obviously given by Bayes’ theorem:
P(S q|Rh ∧ Ico) =
P(Rh| S q ∧ Ico) P(S q| Ico)∑
q′ P(Rh| S q′ ∧ Ico) P(S q′ | Ico) , (21)
or, in terms of the density pS ,
pS (q|Rh ∧ Ico) = qh pS (q| ∧Ico)∫
∆
q′h pS (q′| ∧Ico) dq′
=
[2
3 δ(qh − 1) +
1
3 δ
(
qh − 12
)]
δ(qh + qt − 1). (22)
The plausibility of S (1,0), i.e., that Cecily or Algernon tossed the coin, has thus in-
creased a little.
Remark 3. Note that knowledge of the outcome can help to increase the plausibility
of one of the plausibility-indexed circumstances {S q} at the expense of the others’,
but can never do so within a set of equivalent circumstances like {CC,CA} or {CG,CJ}.
The last formula is a very simple instance of the answer to an inverse problem.
Our point is, again, that the marginalisation over a plausibility-like parameter and
the updating of its distribution can be interpreted as the same operations for a set
of plausibility-indexed circumstances. From this standpoint, and as should be clear
from a previous discussion and remarks, the plausibility P(S q| Ico) (and its density
pS (q| Ico)) is not the plausibility of a plausibility, but simply the plausibility of a
circumstance, the latter being indexed in a particular way.
3 Second Example: multiple measurements, particular
convex structures of circumstances, updating
3.1 Context
The following example differs from the first in the number of measurements and
circumstances considered. Consequences: the space of parameters has particular
10In Egorov’s sense [95, 96, 97]; see also [98, 99, 100, 101] and cf. [102, 103, 104].
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convex structures, and the plausibilities of the outcomes of one measurement can be
‘updated’ upon knowledge of the outcome of the other.
We have a box with two buttons, marked ‘Letter’ and ‘Number’, and a display.
Push the ‘Letter’ button, and either ‘a’ or ‘b’ appears on the display; push ‘Number’,
and ‘1’ or ‘2’ appears. We can push each button only once, and only one at a time.
Call, improperly, measurement the act of pushing a button and reading the display;
call ‘outcome’ what is then read on the display. Denote the ‘Letter’ measurement
by ML and its outcomes by {RLa ,RLb }; the ‘Number’ measurement by MN and its
outcomes by {RN1 ,RN2 }.
Given only the above knowledge, we should assign a plausibility distribution
(1/2, 1/2) to the outcomes of each measurement. But we know in fact something
more about the construction of the box: inside, besides some sort of machinery, there
is a chest containing an even number, 2N, of balls. Each ball is marked either ‘a1’,
‘a2’, ‘b1’, or ‘b2’. When a button is pushed, the machinery draws one of the balls
from the chest and sends, depending on the button, either the letter or the number
printed on the drawn ball to the display; and then puts the ball back into the chest.11
We have also a very important piece of knowledge as to how the 2N balls were
originally chosen and put into the chest: this initially contained 4N balls, marked
‘a1’, ‘a2’, ‘b1’, and ‘b2’ in equal proportions (i.e., N balls marked ‘a1’, N ‘a2’, etc.).
From these, 2N balls where taken away, so only 2N remained in the chest. This is
all we know; denote it (together with everyday knowledge concerning balls, buttons,
boxes, etc.) by IN .
From IN , some points are immediately clear. First, not all the 2N balls in the
chest can be marked ‘a1’, nor all ‘a2’, etc., since the chest initially contained only
N of each type. Second, if all the 2N balls have the ‘a’ mark, then N of them must
necessarily be of the ‘a1’ kind and the other N must be of the ‘a2’ kind. Similarly for
the marks ‘b’ and, exchanging the rôle of letters and numbers, ‘1’ and ‘2’.
3.2 Introducing a set of circumstances
Let us analyse the context IN into a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possible
circumstances. Different choices are possible. One is to consider the possible sets
of balls left in (or equivalently, taken away from) the chest. The number of circum-
stances thus defined is given by the number of ways of choosing 2N objects from
a collection of 4N distinct ones without regard to order — the binomial coefficient(4N
2N
)
. Note that it matters which of the ‘a1’-marked balls are chosen, and likewise
for the others. Our knowledge is symmetric in respect of these circumstances, hence
they are assigned equal plausibilities.12
11This renders the temporal order of the measurements (if both are performed) irrelevant. That is
why we are not making temporal considerations. (Note also that we do not need to suppose that the urn
is shaken after the replacement of the ball: this would add nothing to our state of knowledge, since we
do not know how the machine makes the replacement anyhow.)
12That is, they are assigned equal plausibilities not because ‘the balls are initially chosen at random’
or something of the kind, but because we just do not know how they have been chosen. In fact, they
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Another choice is to consider as a circumstance the numbers of balls marked ‘a1’,
‘a2’, etc. left in the chest instead. Note the difference with the previous choice: this
is a sort of ‘coarse graining’ thereof. For this reason the newly defined circumstances
are not equally plausible. We settle for this second choice and denote a generic
circumstance by Cαa1,βa2,γb1,δb2, meaning ‘α ‘a1’-marked balls, . . . , and δ ‘b2’-
marked balls are left in the chest’. The coefficients α , β , etc. must obviously sum up
to 2N and each can range from 0 to N.
3.3 Plausibility-indexing the circumstances; their particular set
As in the previous example, suppose that we are not interested in the details of the
circumstances above, but only in the plausibilities they lead us to assign to the out-
comes of the two measurements ML and MN. We can group the circumstances into
plausibility-indexed equivalence classes, as before. In the present case the equiv-
alence must take into account two plausibility distributions, one for each measure-
ment.
Here is an example for N = 2. The two different circumstances C(2a1,0a2,1b1,1b2)
and C(1a1,1a2,2b1,0b2) lead both to the same plausibility distribution (1/2, 1/2) for the
‘Letter’ measurement, and to the same distribution (3/4, 1/4) for the ‘Number’ mea-
surement (as is clear by simply counting their ‘a’s, ‘b’s, ‘1’s, and ‘2’s). Moreover,
only these two circumstances lead to the plausibility distributions above, as the reader
can prove. By theorem (10), also their disjunction C(2a1,0a2,1b1,1b2) ∨ C(1a1,1a2,2b1,0b2)
leads to the same distributions and can thus be denoted by
S ((1/2,1/2), (3/4,1/4)) ≔ C(2a1,0a2,1b1,1b2) ∨C(1a1,1a2,2b1,0b2). (23)
This is one of the plausibility-indexed circumstances. Its plausibility is the sum
of its disjuncts’ plausibilities, P[S ((1/2,1/2), (3/4,1/4)) | IN] = P(C(2a1,0a2,1b1,1b2)| IN) +
P(C(1a1,1a2,2b1,0b2)| IN).
In general, for any N, we have plausibility-indexed circumstances denoted by
S (qL,qN), the parameters qL and qN corresponding to the plausibility distributions for
the ‘Letter’ and the ‘Number’ measurements. The indexing is such that
P(Rki | Mk ∧ S (qL,qN) ∧ IN) = qki for k = L,N and all appropriate i. (24)
We leave to the reader the pleasure of proving that there is a total of N2 + (N + 1)2
plausibility-indexed circumstances, i.e., of distinct values for the parameters (qL, qN).
They can be represented by points on the plane qLa qN1 as illustrated in fig. 1 for the
cases N = 1, N = 4, and N = 16 respectively. It is not difficult to see (especially
looking at the figure for N = 16) that as N → ∞ their set ΓN becomes dense in the
convex set Γ∞ defined by
Γ∞ ≔ {(qL, qN) | ‖qL‖∞ + ‖qN‖∞ 6 1}, (25)
can have been chosen according to a particular scheme; the point is that we do not know such scheme.
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Figure 1: Possible values of the plausibilities qLa and qN1 for N = 1, 4, and 16.
They are in bijective correspondence with the plausibility-indexed circumstances.
The grey region is the set of all possible pairs of plausibility distributions for two
generic measurements.
where ‖q‖∞ is the supremum norm ‖q‖∞ ≔ maxi{qi}. Thus in the limit N → ∞
we may effectively work with a continuum of plausibility-indexed circumstances in
bijection with the points of this set. Denote this ‘limit context’ by I∞.
We observe two interesting facts. The first is that Γ∞ is a proper subset of the
set of all possible pairs of plausibility distributions for two generic measurements
(the grey square region in the figure); the latter is the Cartesian product of two one-
dimensional simplices, ∆1 × ∆1. We could have let the parameters (qL, qN) range
over the latter set; in this case, however, the contexts IN and I∞ would have led us
to a vanishing plausibility density for those parameter values not belonging to Γ∞.
13
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The second interesting fact is that neither Γ∞ nor the larger set ∆1 ×∆1 are simplices.
It is so because we are considering two measurements (had we considered a single
measurement with four outcomes, we would have dealt with a three-dimensional
simplex instead).13 See also remark 7.
3.4 Analysis by marginalisation
We can write the plausibility distributions for the measurements as marginalisations
over the plausibility-indexed circumstances {S (qL,qN)}, using the latter’s plausibilities
{P[S (qL,qN)| IN]}. Denote for brevity (qL, qN) ≕ q¯, hence {S (qL,qN)} ≡ {S q¯}. Then
(
P(Rki | Mk ∧ IN)
)
=
∑
q¯∈ΓN
(
P(Rki | Mk ∧ S q¯ ∧ IN)
)
P(S q¯| IN),
=
∑
q¯∈ΓN
qk P(S q¯| IN),
k = L,N (26)
Also this formula, like (3) and (18), looks like a weighted sum of plausibilities, and
P(S q¯| IN) looks like the plausibility of two plausibility distributions. But this is not
the case, just as it was not in the example of the coin: the propositions {S q¯} speak not
about plausibilities but about possible preparations of the box and its contents; yet
they are suitably indexed according to the plausibilities they lead us to assign to the
measurements’ outcomes.
The sums above can also be replaced by integrals over the set Γ∞,
(
P(Rki | Mk ∧ IN)
)
=
∫
Γ∞
qk pS (q¯| IN) dq¯, (27)
where the density q¯ 7→ pS (q¯| I∞) is introduced just like in the example of the coin.
3.5 ‘Updating’ the plausibilities of the circumstances and the outcomes
Suppose that the ‘Letter’ button has been pushed and the outcome ‘a’ has appeared on
the display. This knowledge places us in a new context, expressed by the proposition
ML ∧ RLa ∧ I. We ask: (1) What plausibilities
P(S q¯|RLa ∧ ML ∧ IN) (28)
do we assign to the plausibility-indexed circumstances {S (qL,qN)} in the new context?
Furthermore, we still have the possibility of pushing the ‘Number’ button once. So
we also ask: (2) What plausibilities
P(RNi | MN ∧ RLa ∧ ML ∧ IN) (29)
13You might ask: “Couldn’t we consider a single measurement with the four outcomes ‘a1’, ‘a2’,
‘b1’, ‘b2’ instead?”. The answer is: yes, we could have introduced a single fictive measurement with
ML and MN arising as marginals. But what for? After all, the rules of this game do not make allowance
for such a measurement.
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do we now assign to the outcomes {RN1 ,RN2 } in case we push the ‘Number’ button?
Let us answer the first question. We use the assumption (valid in the context IN)
that knowledge of the performance of any of the two measurements (but not of their
outcomes!) is irrelevant for assigning plausibilities to the circumstances:
P(S q¯| Mk ∧ IN) = P(S q¯| ML ∧ MN ∧ IN) = P(S q¯| IN) for all q¯, k. (30)
With this assumption and eq. (24), Bayes’ theorem yields a simplified form for the
sought plausibilities (28):
P(S q¯|RLa ∧ ML ∧ IN) =
qLa P(S q¯| IN)∑
q¯′ q′La P(S q¯′ | IN)
. (31)
This is also the answer to an inverse problem. Note, again, that it expresses the
updated plausibility distribution, not ‘of the parameter q¯’, but of propositions like
‘There are α ‘a1’-marked balls, . . . , and δ ‘b2’-marked balls left in the chest; or . . . ;
or α ′ ‘a1’-marked balls, . . . , and δ ‘b2’-marked balls left in the chest’.
To answer the second question we use, beside assumption (30), the following
fact, which holds in our context IN : If we want to determine the plausibility dis-
tribution for one of the measurements, and we know which particular circumstance
holds, then for us it is irrelevant to know whether the other measurement has been
performed, or which outcome it has yielded. For example, if we are interested in
the plausibilities of the outcomes of the ‘Number’ measurement, and we know that
a particular circumstance S q¯ holds (e.g., that in the chest there are two ‘a1’-marked
balls, one ‘a2’-marked ball, etc.; or one ‘a1’-marked ball, one ‘a2’-marked ball, etc.),
then knowledge of the outcome of the mere performance of ‘Letter’ measurement is
irrelevant. In formulae,
P[Rki | (Rlj ∧ Ml) ∧ Mk ∧ S q¯ ∧ IN] = P(Rki | Ml ∧ Mk ∧ S q¯ ∧ IN) =
P(Rki | Mk ∧ S q¯ ∧ IN) for all k, l , k, and appropriate i, j. (32)
Analysing eq. (29) in terms of circumstances and using eqs. (31) and (32) we find
P(RNi | MN ∧ RLa ∧ ML ∧ IN) =
∑
q¯ qNi q
L
a P(S q¯ | IN)∑
q¯′ q′La P(S q¯′ | IN)
. (33)
In regard to the assumptions summarised in eqs. (30) and (32), cf. remark 9.
4 Generalisation and summary of principal formulae
The two examples should suffice to give an idea of the interpretation of q¯-like pa-
rameters and of their plausibilities, and of the principal consequences of this inter-
pretation. The reader could try to make similar analyses for the toy models by Kirk-
patrick [105, 106, 107], Spekkens [108], or us [109, 110]. We shall now present the
idea in general and abstract terms. Some additional remarks will also be given.
15
PortaMana, Månsson, Bjo¨rk ‘Plausibilities of plausibilities’: the circumstance approach
4.1 Experiments, outcomes, circumstances
In the general case we have a context I and a set of m measurements, represented by
propositions Mk, k = 1, . . . ,m. Each measurement Mk has mutually exclusive and
exhaustive outcomes represented by a set of propositions {Rki }. The number of out-
comes can vary from measurement to measurement, so that i ranges over appropriate
sets for different k. The index k is omitted when no confusion arises.
Remark 4. The use of the terms ‘measurement’ and ‘outcome’ is only dictated by
concreteness. The formalism and the discussion presented apply in fact to more gen-
eral concepts. What we call ‘measurement’ could be only a casual observation, or
simply a ‘state of affairs’ which can present itself in mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive ‘forms’ (the ‘outcomes’). The term ‘measurement’ shall hence be divested here
of those connotations implying active planning and control, which are not relevant
to our study. Moreover, a ‘measurement’ needs not be associated with a point or
short interval in time or space. It can e.g. be a collection of observations; in this
case its ‘outcomes’ are all possible combinations of results from these observations.
Finally, note that the m measurements are generally different, i.e., they are not neces-
sarily ‘repetitions’ of the ‘same’ measurement — a case that will be discussed in the
second paper instead.
A set of circumstances {C j} is introduced; these represent a sort of more detailed,
possible descriptions of the context I, and are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e.
we know that one and only one of them holds:
P(C j′ ∧C j′′ | I) = 0 for all j′ and j′′ , j′, (34)
P(∨ jC j| I) = 1. (35)
The plausibilities of the measurements’ outcomes conditional on the circum-
stances,
P(Ri| Mk ∧ C j ∧ I) for all j, k, and appropriate i, (36)
are assumed to be given.
Remark 5. The notion of ‘circumstance’, represented by propositions C j and later
also S q, has been further explained in remark 1. An example of circumstance from
§ 2 is ‘Gwendolen tossed the coin’; other examples are ‘The temperature during the
experiment was 25 °C’ and the more elaborated ‘We studied the density of monodis-
perse spherical particles in a tall cylindrical tube as a series of external excitations,
consisting of discrete, vertical shakes or ‘taps,’ were applied to the container’ [111].
As in the case of ‘measurement’, a circumstance needs not be related to a single point
or short interval in space or time. For example, in assigning the plausibility that it
will rain or has rained in a given place at a given time, a circumstance might consists
in a specific history of worldwide meteorological conditions under the preceding two
years. For reasons discussed in remark 2, we require that a circumstance be described
or specified in concrete terms, and metastatements like ‘The samples are drawn from
a distribution f ’ or ‘The plausibility of head is 1/3’ are excluded. Finally, the choice
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of an appropriate set of circumstances, i.e., of the appropriate way and depth to anal-
yse a particular problem (the context), can only be decided on an individual basis, of
course.
4.2 Plausibility-indexing the circumstances
The circumstances are then grouped into equivalence classes. Two circumstances are
equivalent if they lead to the same plausibility distributions for each measurement
Mk:
C j′ ∼ C j′′ ⇐⇒

P(Ri| Mk ∧C j′ ∧ I) = P(Ri| Mk ∧ C j′′ ∧ I)
for all k and appropriate i.
(37)
By construction the equivalence classes are in injective correspondence with
the possible numerical values of the plausibility distributions for the measurements,
(q1, q2, . . . ). Denote a generic such value by q¯ ≔ (qk), its equivalence class by q¯∼,
and membership by C j ∈ q¯∼ or simply j ∈ q¯∼. We take all disjunctions of equivalent
circumstances
S q¯ ≔
∨
j∈q¯∼
C j, (38)
and call these (in lack of a better name) plausibility-indexed circumstances, short-
ened to ‘circumstances’ whenever no confusion is possible. Conditional on such a
circumstance S q¯, the plausibilities of the outcomes have numerical values identical
to its indices:
P(Rki | Mk ∧ S q¯ ∧ I) = qki , (39)
a formula that reminds of a generalised Bernoulli model (cf. eq. (1)).
Our main belief, already stated in the coin example, is that plausibility-like pa-
rameters used as arguments of plausibilities can always be interpreted to stand for
some appropriate plausibility-indexed circumstances.14
The passage to plausibility-grouped circumstances can have two main motiva-
tions. (1) We can be interested in the plausibilities the circumstances lead to, rather
than in the latter’s intrinsic details. (2) We may want a set of circumstances with
the property that knowledge of outcomes can increase the plausibility of only one
circumstance. This is true for the set {S q¯}, but not for the set {C j} in general. In
fact, knowledge of new outcomes can never lead to a alteration of the ratios of the
plausibilities of two or more equivalent circumstances. Cf. remark 3 and see [1, 2]
and [46, § 5.3].
14What constitutes a circumstance is largely a matter of situation, purpose, and personal good taste
as well. The formalism presented cannot think up the circumstances for us. In § 2 we spoke e.g. about
different persons’ skills in coin-tossing; but other people could speak about different values of the coin’s
‘propensity’ to come up heads. Perhaps the reason why ‘de Finettians’ have always felt uneasy about
plausibility-like parameters and their priors was that these mathematical objects leave room to ideas and
concepts that are unnecessary or not in good taste (cf. Jaynes [20], ch. 3, ‘Logic versus propensity’). To
keep off these ideas they partially denied priors their meaning as plausibilities (this has led, fortunately,
to some very beautiful ideas and theorems [64]). We hope to have shown here and in the next paper
that there is no need to adopt such extreme measures.
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Remark 6. Suppose that to each outcome Ri of some measurement Mk is associated
a value ri of some physical quantity, so that it makes sense to speak of the expected
value15 of this quantity in a generic context Mk ∧ J:
〈r| Mk ∧ J〉 ≔
∑
i
ri P(Ri| Mk ∧ J). (40a)
In our case, the formation of equivalence classes of circumstances can then be made
with respect to expected values instead of plausibilities, i.e.,
C j′ ∼ C j′′ ⇐⇒ 〈rk | Mk ∧ C j′ ∧ I〉 = 〈rk | Mk ∧ C j′′ ∧ I〉 for all k. (40b)
In this way we obtain a set of expectation-indexed circumstances {S 〈r〉}. Note that
two different circumstances in such a set (leading hence to different expectations)
may lead to the same probability distributions for the outcomes; therefore this set is
not to be confused with, and has not the same applications of, our {S q¯}.
Particularly interesting is the space Γ of the parameters q¯. Since these correspond
to numerical values of plausibility distributions for the measurements, Γ is in general
a (possibly proper) subset of a Cartesian product of simplices k ∆ (k), the simplex
∆ (k) corresponding to the plausibility distribution for the kth measurement.
Remark 7. The features of the subset Γ will depend on the nature of the circum-
stances {C j} (and thus of the {S q¯}). In some cases it is simply postulated that some
kinds of circumstances do not present themselves, and this will delimit the subset
accordingly. We saw an instance of this in the box example of § 3, in which the set
Γ was, for each N, a special proper subset ΓN of the Cartesian product of two two-
dimensional simplices (the grey square region in the figures). There are examples
of physical theories where we postulate (by induction from numerous observations)
that the set of ‘circumstances in which a system is prepared’ — often called states
— is somehow restricted. This also restricts the space of the mathematical objects
representing these states to particular, non-simplicial (convex) sets. The most notable
example is quantum theory, in which the set of statistical operators — the mathemat-
ical objects representing the states — has very strange shapes [112, 113, 114, 115].16
The set of Gibbs distributions in classical statistical mechanics provides another ex-
ample.
Remark 8. The plausibility-indexed circumstances need not be parametrised by the
values of the plausibility distributions (qk) ≡ q¯. Other parametrisations can be used
as long as they are in bijective correspondence with the q¯ one, and some may be
more useful (cf. [116]). Usually, what is relevant is the convex structure of the set of
parameters Γ , a point on which we shall return in the third paper.
15Which should not be confused with the average [92], defined in terms of observed frequencies.
Cf. footnote 9.
16That is, if we represent this set so as to preserve its convex properties, which are the relevant ones
(see the third note of this series).
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4.3 Priors and analysis by marginalisation
If the initial circumstances {C j} have the plausibility distribution
(
P(C j| I)
)
, by the
sum rule the plausibility-indexed circumstances have distributions
P(S q¯| I) =
∑
j∈q¯∼
P(C j| I) (41)
(see also remark 11).
In terms of the plausibility-indexed circumstances, the plausibility distribution
for each measurement outcome Rki can be expressed in marginal form as
P(Rki | Mk ∧ I) =
∑
q¯∈Γ
P(Rki | Mk ∧ S q¯ ∧ I) P(S q¯| I),
≡
∑
q¯∈Γ
qki P(S q¯| I),
≡
∫
Γ
qki pS (q¯| I) dq¯,
(42)
(cf. eq. (3)) where q¯ 7→ pS (q¯| I) is an appropriate generalised function [98, 117, 118,
119] (see also [120, 121]). The sudden appearance of an integral can be justified (as
customary) as follows: q¯ becomes a continuous parameter whose range is some set
Γ such that conv Γ ⊆ Γ ⊆ k ∆ (k) (where conv Γ is the convex hull of Γ ), and we
introduce a density function q¯ 7→ pS (q¯| I) such that, for each ω ⊆ Γ (from a suitable
σ-field of subsets), ∫ω pS (q¯| I) dq¯ =
∑
q¯′∈ω∩Γ P(S q¯′ | I).17
Note that to obtain the marginal form above it is assumed that knowledge of
the measurement performed (but not of its outcome!) is irrelevant for assigning the
plausibilities to the circumstances (cf. eq. (30)):
P(S q¯| Mk1 ∧ · · · ∧ Mkn ∧ I) = P(S q¯| I) for all q¯, n = 1, . . .m, and {kt}. (43)
4.4 Updating the plausibilities of circumstances and outcomes
Upon knowledge of the outcomes {Rk1i1 , . . . ,R
kn
in } of any subset {Mk1 , . . . ,Mkn}, n 6
m, of measurements, the {kt} being all mutually different, the plausibilities of the
circumstances are updated, with the assumption (43), according to
P[S q¯| (Rk1i1 ∧ Mk1) ∧ · · · ∧ (R
kn
in ∧ Mkn) ∧ I] =
qk1i1 · · · q
kn
in P(S q¯| I)∑
q¯′∈Γ q′
k1
i1 · · · q′
kn
in P(S q¯′ | I)
, (44)
17No one forbids us to introduce additional impossible fictitious circumstances {C j′ } (which may
involve, e.g., ‘centaurs, nectar, ambrosia, fairies’ [122]) constructed so as to ‘complete’ the set of
plausibility-indexed circumstances, i.e., in such a way that for each q¯ ≡ (qki ) ∈ Γ (note the bar!) there is
always an S q¯ — possibly defined in terms of the fictitious {C j′ } — for which P(Ri| Mk ∧ S q¯ ∧ I) = qki .
This operation — which is, mark, not necessary — has no importance nor mathematical consequences
because the fictitious circumstances are impossible, i.e., their plausibilities in the context I are naught,
and thus terms containing them give no contribution in formulae like (42) or (47).
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or, in terms of the density pS ,
pS [q¯| (Rk1i1 ∧ Mk1) ∧ · · · ∧ (R
kn
in ∧ Mkn) ∧ I] =
qk1i1 · · · q
kn
in pS (q¯| I)∫
Γ
q′k1i1 · · · q′
kn
in pS (q¯′| I) dq¯′
. (45)
These formulae are valid for n > 2 only if we assume that, when a circumstance
is known and we want to assign a plausibility distribution for a measurement, knowl-
edge of performance of other measurements or of their outcomes is irrelevant (this is
what Caves calls, in a slightly different context (see the second paper in this series),
‘learning through the parameter’ [78]):
P(Rki | E ∧ Mk ∧ S q¯ ∧ I) = P(Rki | Mk ∧ S q¯ ∧ I)
for all q¯, where E is any conjunction of any number of mutually
different {Mkt } and any number of {Rktit } (each kt , k).
(46)
Under the assumptions (43) and (46), we also obtain, by marginalisation over
the {S q¯}, the plausibility of an outcome Rki given knowledge of outcomes of other
measurements {Mkt} different from Mk:
P[Rki | (Rk1i1 ∧ Mk1)∧ · · · ∧ (R
kn
in ∧ Mkn)∧ Mk ∧ I] =
∫
Γ
qki q
k1
i1 · · · q
kn
in pS (q¯| I) dq¯∫
Γ
q′k1i1 · · · q′
kn
in pS (q¯′| I) dq¯′
. (47)
Remark 9. We should always be careful in assuming and using the conditions sum-
marised in eqs. (43) and (46), because they in many cases do not hold. An example
would be provided by the example of the coin toss if we considered other tosses
made by the same, unknown, person. In the circumstance in which Jack tosses the
coin, eq. (46) would not hold because from the results of other tosses we would
learn more about Jack’s skills in coin-tossing. In fact, even eq. (7) could cease to
be valid for other tosses, and our set of circumstances would no longer be appropri-
ate. We discuss similar matters in more detail in the second part of this study. In
general, also the relations amongst the times or places at which measurements are
performed can be relevant and thus require a careful analysis. Cf. the examples in
refs. [105, 106, 107, 108, 109].
4.5 Further remarks
Remark 10. A very important point is that the analysis of the context in terms of
circumstances is far from unique (cf. footnote 14). Different sets {C′j′}, {C′′j′′}, {C′′′j′′′},
etc. of circumstances can be introduced to analyse the context, and from them cor-
responding sets of plausibility-indexed circumstances {S ′¯q | q¯ ∈ Γ ′}, {S ′′¯q | q¯ ∈ Γ ′′},
{S ′′′q¯ | q¯ ∈ Γ ′′′}, etc. can be constructed in the standard way. The circumstances of
each set have to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive for the present formalism to
hold, but they need not be exclusive with those of the other sets. For example, in
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the case of the coin toss (§ 2) we could analyse the context Ico into another set of
circumstances, say {C′r | r ∈ ]−1, 1[} with
C′r ≔ ‘The mass-centre of the coin lies on the coin’s (oriented) axis a
fraction r/2 of the total width away from the coin centre’.
(48)
The analysis and the construction of the plausibility-indexed circumstances would
proceed exactly in the same way, apart from possibly different values of their plausi-
bilities.18
Different sets {C′j′}, {C′′j′′}, . . . can also be combined into a single set with circum-
stances {C j′ j′′... ≔ C′j′ ∧C′′j′′ ∧ · · · }. These will be mutually exclusive and exhaustive
by construction. Again, the corresponding plausibility-indexed set {S q¯} will ensue in
the usual way.
Remark 11. In view of the preceding remark it is clear that we can find a meaning for
a plausibility-parameter like q¯ in terms of a set of circumstances, but not the meaning,
because that set is not unique. This also implies that different choices of priors for
q¯ need not be contradictory, because they can arise as the plausibilities for different
sets of circumstances. There are, however, some compatibility conditions that the
plausibility distributions for two or more sets of plausibility-indexed circumstances
must satisfy (here stated in terms of densities):
∫
Γ
′
qk1i1 pS ′(q¯| I) dq¯ =
∫
Γ
′′
qk1i1 pS ′′(q¯| I) dq¯,
∫
Γ
′
qk1i1 q
k2
i2 pS ′(q¯| I) dq¯ =
∫
Γ
′′
qk1i1 q
k2
i2 pS ′′(q¯| I) dq¯,
. . .∫
Γ
′
q1i1 q
2
i2 · · · qmim pS ′(q¯| I) dq¯ =
∫
Γ
′′
q1i1 q
2
i2 · · · qmim pS ′′(q¯| I) dq¯,
for all mutually different kt and appropriate it (49)
(i.e., some of their moments must be equal), where m is the number of measure-
ments. These conditions arise simply analysing the plausibilities P(Ri| Mk ∧ I) and
(47) first by means of one set of circumstances, then by means of the other, equat-
ing the expressions thus obtained, and applying property (39) (under the assump-
tions (43) and (46)).
Remark 12. The formalism lends naturally itself also to iteration. One can introduce
‘circumstances of circumstances’, etc., i.e. deeper and deeper levels of analysis for
the context I. What mathematically comes about looks like a hierarchy of ‘plausi-
bilities of plausibilities’, ‘plausibilities of plausibilities of plausibilities’, etc., which
18Note that the position of the mass-centre of a coin is not a very important factor in the assignment
of a plausibility to heads or tails. See Jaynes’ discussion [20, ch. 10].
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Good calls ‘probabilities of Type I, II, III’, etc. [61]. Of course, such a cornucopia of
recursive analyses may be appropriate and useful in some cases, while in others may
just lead to constipation.
Remark 13. The interpretation here presented may also provide another point of view
on theories of interval-valued probabilities (see e.g. [123, 124][75, esp. § 3.1] and
cf. [61, § 2.2][125]), an in this sense completes or re-interprets studies by e.g. Jami-
son [62], Levi [125, 126], Fishburn [127], Nau [128].
5 Conclusions
We often have the need to use statistical models with plausibility-like parameters,
especially in classical and quantum mechanics, and must face the problems of choos-
ing an suitable parameter space and a plausibility distribution on this space. These
problems would sometimes be less difficult if the parameters could be given some
interpretation.
Some interpret the parameters as ‘propensities’ or ‘physical probabilities’. But
these concepts do not make sense to us.
De Finettians say that we should not interpret the parameters, but think in terms
of infinitely exchangeable sequences instead; the parameters and their priors then
arise as mathematical devices. But we do not like being forced to think in terms
of infinite sequences, whose vast majority (∞) of elements must then necessarily be
fictitious. And there are situations that can be repeated a finite number of times only.
In addition to this, looking at concrete applications of statistical models it seems
that behind the parameters we often have ‘at the back of our minds’ an idea of some
possible hypotheses — ‘circumstances’ — that could hold in the context under study,
e.g. a physical measurement. These circumstances could help us in the assignment
of plausibilities. And they need not concern ‘causes’ or ‘propensities’; see remarks 1
and 5. At the same time, we are sometimes not interested in the intrinsic details of
such circumstances, but only in the plausibilities that we eventually assign on their
grounds.
We have seen in this study that plausibility theory allows us, starting from any set
{C j} of circumstances, to form another, ‘coarse-grained’ set {S q} with the property
that its circumstances lead each one to a different plausibility distribution. The cir-
cumstances of this set can then be uniquely indexed by the plausibility distributions
they lead us to assign. This set, moreover, is invariant with respect to changes in
the plausibilities of the initial and the coarse-grained sets of circumstances, {P(C j| I)}
and {P(S q¯| I)}.
This suggests that plausibility-like parameters like q, when used as arguments of
plausibility formulae, can always be interpreted to stand for some appropriately in-
dexed circumstances like S q. With mathematical care, this may even hold for param-
eters of continuous statistical models. Parameter priors like f (q| I) can consequently
be interpreted as plausibilities of circumstances P(S q| I).
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The study of how these priors are updated when repetitions of ‘similar’ measure-
ments occur, and of particular applications to classical and quantum mechanics, are
developed in the next two papers.
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